This paper derives analytical expressions for aggregate personal income tax revenue obtained from a multi-schedular and multi-regional personal income tax system, with revenue divided among central and regional governments. Aggregate income tax revenue is expressed as a function of characteristics of the distribution of taxable income, making it possible to identify the sources of revenue differences among regions. The approach is applied to the tax structure in Spain, and the effects of income distribution differences among the Spanish regions is examined.
Introduction
A number of countries have separate tax structures, with different tax rates and income thresholds, for different sources of income, in addition to different rules regarding eligible deductions. Thus they are said to have multiple 'schedules'. In addition, tax revenue in some countries is divided between central government and autonomous regions or states. Some transfer payments, in the form of tax credits, may also be administered at both the central and regional level. One feature of fiscal policy in a multi-regional economy involves transfers among regions having quite different population sizes and income distributions, relating not only to the forms of the relevant distributions but the extent to which incomes are derived from different sources. These elements introduce a number of complexities in modelling aggregate tax revenue.
For tax planning purposes it is important to be able to model aggregate revenue allowing for these complications and in particular to be able to estimate the implications for total income tax revenue of a range of exogenous changes. Those changes include simple changes in tax rates and thresholds and, importantly, changes in the income distributions of different income sources within regions.
The aim of this paper is therefore to provide a method of examining the implications for total tax revenue of a number of changes, including changes in the distribution of income and in the tax structure itself, in a multi-schedular and multi-regional economy. It is shown how an expression for aggregate tax revenue depends on proportions of people, within each region, and proportions of total income between the income thresholds of the income tax functions.
The methods used are widely applicable. However, after deriving the general results, the approach is applied to the Spanish personal income tax structure. This provides an interesting case study as it has undergone significant reforms, in additional to the type of base-broadening and rate-reducing changes which have been common in many other countries.
2 Furthermore, income taxation since 2002 is shared between central and regional governments, consisting of 15 autonomous regions within the Common Territory. In addition, different tax rates and thresholds apply to a range of income sources in a multi-schedular tax structure. Various tax credits exist at central and regional levels, some of which depend on non-income as well as income characteristics of tax units.
Section 2 formulates analytical expressions for the tax liability of each tax unit.
Aggregate tax revenue is then examined in more detail in Section 3. The method is applied to Spain in Section 4. Brief conclusions are given in Section 5.
A Tax Structure with Several Schedules and Central and Regional Rates
This section describes a personal income tax structure containing several schedules where, in addition, tax revenue is divided between each region and the central government.
Income Taxation of a Tax Unit
Let hi x denote the taxable income of tax unit h from source 1,. income thresholds are typically common. This is the case examined here. Thus, letting superscripts C and R refer to central and regional rates respectively:
For a multi-step tax structure with K steps,   0
Hence in the present context, if
, unit h is in the kth tax bracket for source i and the following expressions describe income taxation at central and regional levels.
The terms '
C ki a and '
R ki a are the corresponding thresholds such that tax liability in a multi-threshold tax structure can be expressed in terms of an equivalent single-rate structure. In writing the expressions (4) and (5) the marginal tax rate terms, t, along with the effective thresholds, ' a , need the h subscripts, in order to clarify the point that the tax rates and thresholds indicated are those that apply to the tax unit in question, depending on the tax bracket into which the unit falls.
Suppose, in addition, there are central and regional government non-refundable tax credits of C C and R C . Total tax paid by unit h is expressed as:
The existence of non-refundable tax credits means that several cases must be distinguished. The most common situation where tax unit h is such that
The expression given in (6) above for tax liability is thus simplified to:
and:
A further simplification is available where, as here, central and regional income thresholds are the same. Using the above expression for ' k a , it can be shown that:
The other cases follow directly from the above results.
Total Tax Revenue
This section derives aggregate revenue for the tax system described above. It also demonstrates how the effects on revenue of changes in income distribution, along with changes in the tax rates and income thresholds can easily be examined.
Aggregation over Individuals
Suppose there are C R n  taxpayers whose central and regional tax exceeds the relevant credits, equations (8) and (9) can be used to write their tax as:
which becomes: 
The total tax revenue can therefore be expressed as:
Where, as above, hi x is the taxable income for income source i for tax unit h . The terms C C and R C denote the appropriate average value defined over taxpayers, remembering the tax schedule asymmetry whereby tax must be positive. The first term in (12) can be rewritten as:
In the case of a single source of income, with a multi-step function, the tax per person can be expressed in terms of summary information about the distribution of taxable income, which determines the proportion of tax units falling into the various marginal tax rate groups.
3 For example, suppose that   F x denotes the distribution function of taxable income, x>0. Tax per unit is thus:
Define   1 F x as the first-moment distribution function, that is the proportion of total income of units below x, and introduce the general term   k G a , defined as:
The first term in curly brackets gives the proportion of total income between adjacent thresholds, and the second term in curly brackets is the number of tax units between those thresholds. The expression in (16) can also be written as:
The first term inside the square brackets of (16) is the slope of the Lorenz curve of the relevant distribution of income, between the two points associated with adjacent income tax thresholds. The Lorenz curve has a slope of 45 degrees at the arithmetic mean; that is,
 . The second term in the square brackets is simply the ratio of the 'effective' threshold to arithmetic mean income. And of course the term in curly brackets in (16) is the proportion of people within the tax bracket.
Total revenue per person is thus:
Hence, for the case of several income sources, each with its own tax schedule, total tax revenue over all individuals and sources becomes:
The first term in equation (18) can usefully be written in vector notation. Define the column vectors:
Then, if a prime indicates that the vector is written as a row vector:
8 These values may be placed in a column vector, denoted   ' t G . Then if x represents a column vector whose ith element consists of the arithmetic mean, i x , then:
where, as before, a prime indicates transposition. This allows the effects of tax and income distribution changes to be easily examined. Several illustrations of such potential effects are given in the following section, in the context of the Spanish personal income tax.
An Application: The Spanish Tax Structure
The Spanish tax structure displays the characteristics considered in the previous section, having recently undergone significant tax reforms. In particular, income The marginal rates and thresholds for the first income source are shown in Table 1 .
For the second source, tax is paid at fixed central and regional (marginal and average) rates of 0.111 and 0.069. Table 2 gives, for each region and for all regions combined, the number of individuals who pay positive amounts of tax, along with the arithmetic means of the two income sources. The final two columns of Table 2 show the arithmetic means of the central and regional tax credits, which together give the last term in equation (18).
There are clearly substantial differences in arithmetic mean incomes among regions.
The expression for aggregate revenue in each region requires the various proportions of people and proportions of income below each of the tax thresholds. This is simple for the second source of income, since the tax function is linear. For the first income source, Tables 3 and 4 Table 6 . 
When the total amount of tax credits per (positive) taxpayer, of 1,228+646, is deducted from this result, the net tax per capita is obtained. Multiplying this value by the total number of taxpayers gives the value in the first row of Table 6 . The effects of change in the distribution of income within a region can be examined using the same kind of summary information. For example, if mean income increases, whereby incomes in a region are assumed to increase by the same proportion, this is equivalent to a reduction in the tax thresholds, so that information about the Lorenz curve (the F and 1 F values) can be used to obtain the appropriate G value. A change in inequality can be accommodated by specifying the way in which the Lorenz curve for the region changes.
The difficulty of dealing with the central and regional tax credits and thus aggregate net income tax revenue remains, as an analytical expression for aggregate credits has not been obtained.
Further Comparisons
As suggested above, the effects of changing only the tax rates are easily examined in this framework, as only the vector of marginal rates needs to be altered in expressions corresponding to (19). For example, the previous discussion has not allowed for the small change in the tax rate structure in Madrid in 2007, making it unique among the Spanish regions. The income thresholds for the first income source are the same as in Table 1 above, and the central government rates are the same, but the marginal tax rates for Madrid became 0.0794, 0.0943, 0.1266 and 0.1577 for the four income brackets. This involves a slight reduction in all the rates, with the largest reductions being for the first and second tax brackets. Given the nature of the distribution of income in Madrid for the first source, it is anticipated that this would have relatively little effect on total revenue. But in view of the differences among regions in their income distributions, the same could not be said of the other regions.
The effects on total tax revenue, and revenue within each region, if all regions were to adopt the Madrid structure, can easily be obtained using the information given above. The percentage changes in total (central plus regional) tax revenue and in the regional tax revenue alone are shown in Table 7 . In producing these values, it was assumed that the average tax credits within each region remain unchanged. Clearly the poorer regions, where a much larger proportion of total income is obtained by those who fall into the first two tax brackets, would experience substantially larger reductions in tax revenue. 
Regional Comparisons
The previous subsection considered the effects on all regions of adopting a different regional structure of marginal income tax rates. As explained above, it is possible to use the same basic approach to consider the effects of a range of changes in the taxable income distributions of each region. This is particularly useful in the present context where it is clear that different regions have different fiscal capacities. Such disparities in regional revenue-raising abilities are especially evident when, as here, progressive taxes are assigned partially to regional governments.
16
Central governments normally carry out some form of regional fiscal equalization.
Under these circumstances, sound design of these inter-regional transfers requires a clear understanding of the precise sources of divergence of regional fiscal capacities.
The present approach can thus contribute to the debate on regional transfers by clarifying precisely how regions differ with respect to the tax structure and the distribution of taxpayers. This is because the above analytical results make it evident that differences in revenue hinge on basically four factors: the number and distribution of taxpayers, the distribution of taxable incomes and the specific tax parameters that define the structure: these are the marginal tax rates, tax bracket thresholds and average tax credits. augmented by an additional row and column for the country as a whole. Similarly, the information can be displayed in relative terms, showing the percentage differences in revenue which could be raised by each region, given different assumed characteristics (so that each corresponding leading diagonal element is zero).
To illustrate the kind of information which can be produced along these lines, Tables   8 to 10 Specifically, Table 8 presents the revenue impact of differences in arithmetic mean taxable incomes. Table 9 depicts the effects of differences in the form of the relative taxable income distributions; that is, the arithmetic means are unchanged but the proportions of people in each tax bracket, and the corresponding proportions of total taxable income within each bracket, are assumed to the those of the region in the columns. Finally, Table 10 shows the revenue consequences of simultaneous changes in both the arithmetic mean taxable income and the relative distributions of income.
7
For example, Table 8 shows that if Andalucía were to have the same arithmetic mean taxable income as Aragon (a given percentage change in all incomes), it would have 4.17 per cent higher income tax revenue. However, from Table 9 if Andalucia were to have its actual arithmetic mean, but the same relative form of income distribution as Aragon, it would have slightly less revenue: there would be a reduction of 0.40 per cent. Table 10 indicates that if the distribution of taxable income in Andalucia were the precisely the same as in Aragon (in both absolute and relative terms), its revenue would be 3.77 per cent higher. In fact these effects are additive, so that the elements of Table 10 effectively equal the sum of the corresponding elements in Tables 8 and   9 . 7 In producing these results it has been assumed that average tax credits remain unchanged 
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to derive analytical expressions for aggregate revenue and the revenue elasticity of complex personal income tax systems, as applied to tax units and in aggregate. The complexity arises from the schedular nature of the system, the role of central and regional governments, and the existence of a range of tax credits and eligible expenditures and deductions.
Formal expressions for aggregate tax revenue were derived, in terms of the distribution of taxable income within each region. It was possible to separate total revenue into components relating to the income tax structure and summary measures of the distribution of taxable income, in particular the proportions of taxpayers, and of total taxable income, in each tax bracket. This made it possible to examine the sources of differences among regions.
The general approach was then applied to the personal income tax structure in Spain which, since reforms dating from 2002, has similar characteristics. The role of substantial differences in the income distributions of different Spanish regions was examined.
